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The geographical polarization of the American electorate: a country of 
increasing electoral landslides? 
 
 
Abstract: American politics have become increasingly polarized in recent decades, not only ideologically but 
also geographically. The extent of that geographical polarization is explored at the county and SMSA scales for 
the presidential elections held between 1992 and 2016 and also, at the much finer, precinct, scale for the 
2008, 2012 and 2016 elections. The patterns that emerge show that much of non-metropolitan USA has 
become increasingly dominated by Republican Party candidates, whereas the large metropolitan central cities 
remain dominated by the Democrats. Within those metropolitan areas, change, especially at the 2016 contest, 
was largely confined to their suburban districts. 
 





America is polarized. Our political parties are highly polarized and the American electorate is 
highly polarized. … Political divisions in American politics are now deep and real. (Campbell, 
2016, 1) 
 
Campbell’s claim summarises the large recent literature analysing the growing political polarization 
of United States society, at both elite and grassroots levels. The electorate has become ideologically 
more polarized, and so have its representative bodies. The left and the right differ more than 
previously in their political beliefs, and together outnumber those he defines as moderates. They 
share common (American) values, such as ‘peace and prosperity, a secure nation, equal 
opportunities and justice, an efficient government with fair elections, a successful educational 
system, … [and] a compassionate system of safety nets for those who cannot fend for themselves’ 
(Campbell, 2016, 2), but there are ‘sharp and deep differences between large segments of the 
electorate and between the political parties about what these common goals mean in practice, how 
they might best be achieved, and what role government should play in achieving them’ (p.3). 
 
Much less has been written about a claimed parallel trend – a growing geographical 
polarization in support for the two political parties, the differences between which have become 
wider as a consequence of the increased ideological polarization. (A recent, extensive discussion of 
geographical polarization and its links to – indeed participation in – the ideological polarization, is 
provided by Hopkins, 2017.) The country, it is contended, has become increasingly divided between, 
and dominated by, places that predominantly support the Republican Party (the ‘red places’) and 
those that predominantly support the Democrats (the ‘blue places’), with a consequent reduction in 
those where neither party dominates (the ‘purple places’: Ansolabehere et al., 2006); according to 
several commentators this growing divide – a ‘clustering of like-minded America’ – is tearing the 
country apart (the quote comes from the subtitle of Bishop’s 2009 book, The Big Sort). That 
clustering results from what other commentators – such as Murray (2013) and Florida (2017) – 
identify as a ‘new form of segregation’ as the wealthiest groups (Murray focuses on ‘the new upper 
class’ and Florida on ‘the creative class’) separate themselves from the rest of society. The result is 
that people with particular political ideologies, reflected in their voting behaviour, are spatially 
distancing themselves from those with whom they disagree. The geography of that segregation – 
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and the electoral geography that it underpins – becomes self-reinforcing, further reducing the 
number of ‘purple places’.1 
 
That contention regarding spatial polarization has been subject to some criticism, however, 
with both commentators and academics arguing that the trend identified by Bishop is, at best, 
unclear (neither Murray nor Florida pays much attention to voting patterns). Abrams and Fiorina 
(2012), for example, do not conclude that his analyses do not show increased ‘political residential 
segregation’ – Hopkins’s (2017) book makes clear that it is – but do claim that ‘Bishop’s sweeping 
argument about geographical political sorting has little or no empirical foundation’ (pp.205-206). 
The electoral geography may indeed be changing – indeed, an increasing number of studies of 
individual places have provided clear evidence of the type of polarization claimed by Bishop (for 
example, Kinsella et al., 2015; McDonald, 2011; and Myers, 2013) while statistical studies of national 
trends (e.g. Johnston et al., 2016, 2018; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2015) have provided strong 
evidence of growing spatial polarization in support for the two parties, at three separate spatial 
scales. Whether that polarization has resulted from sorting processes whereby movers within the 
United States are increasingly choosing to live among people with similar political views to their own 
remains open to question: see, for example, Cho et al. (2013, 2018) and Gimpel and Hui (2015), but 
also Mummolo and Nall (2017).  
 
Several commentators have suggested that the impression of greater polarization has been 
created by misleading cartography. Maps of voting in the United States at the county scale, for 
example, emphasise the large, relatively under-populated rural areas at the expense of the 
metropolitan areas where most of the population lives2 – leading the Wikipedia article on the issue 
to conclude that the map distortions ‘contribute to the misperception that the electorate is highly 
polarized by geography’.3  
 
Is that the case? This paper presents an overview of recent – post-1992 – trends in the 
electoral geography of the United States, using both cartographic and statistical analysis to identify 
the extent of any polarization that has occurred at three separate spatial scales – by county (the 
units deployed by Bishop), by type of county (an inner city-rural continuum), and by voting precinct. 
In doing so, it substantially extends Bishop’s analytical framework, uncovering significant 
geographical variations within the national pattern. 
 
The changing electoral geography at the county scale: a landslide of landslides? 
 
Bishop claimed that statistical analyses undertaken by his collaborator, Robert Cushing, using ‘all of 
the several ways to measure segregation’ developed by demographers, had provided convincing 
evidence that since 1976 the trend was ‘for Republicans and Democrats to grow geographically more 
segregated’ but that (Bishop, 2009, 9): 
… the simplest way to describe this political big sort was to look across time at the 
proportion of voters who lived in landslide counties – counties where one party won by 20 
percentage points or more. 
                                                          
1 The term ‘purple places’ can be traced back to Vanderbei’s map of the 2000 US presidential election, devised 
as a student exercise: his maps of that and subsequent elections can be found at http://www.princeton.edu/ 
~rvdb/JAVA/election2016/. It was taken up by US News and World Report in 2004: http://backissues.com/ 
issue/US-News-and-World-Report-October-18-2004 
2 See, for example, Mark Wilson (2012: https://www. fastcodesign.com/1671268/infographic-forget-red-and-






To evaluate and extend his claims, that same definition is deployed here: polarization is represented 
by situations where one party’s candidate for the presidency defeats the other party’s candidate by 
20 percentage points or more (of their combined, two-party vote total). If Bishop is correct, then the 
number of places where this occurred should have increased over the sequence of seven elections 
(1992-2016) for which we have data.4 Use of the 20 percentage points gap between the two 
candidates is, of course, arbitrary but it is a useful threshold because very few counties won by that 
margin by a party at one election were won by the opposing party at a later contest during this 
period. Mapping the so-defined landslide counties thus provides a clear picture of those parts of the 
country where one party dominates. 
 
Bishop’s basic empirical contention that at the county scale the United States has become 
increasingly polarized in its voting for president is readily appreciated by a series of maps showing 
those counties that were won by landslides over the sequence of seven elections beginning with Bill 
Clinton’s 1992 victory over George H. W. Bush.5 A big change occurred between then and 2000, 
when George W. Bush defeated Al Gore. Figure 1 shows that landslide victories characterised only a 
minority of the counties in 1992: 19 per cent of them returned a Democratic landslide and another 
19 per cent returned a Republican landslide, with neither party winning such a clear majority in the 
remaining 62 per cent. The Republican landslides mainly occurred to the west of the Missouri, 
covering much of Nebraska, western Kansas, Oklahoma and Texas plus major segments of Idaho, 
Nevada and Utah (Balentine and Webster, 2018). Democratic Party landslides were more widely 
spread, with clusters on the west coast and in the ‘Black Belt’ along the Mississippi in Arkansas, 
Louisiana and Mississippi, as well as in Vermont, West Virginia and several areas with relatively large 
Hispanic populations (along the Rio Grande border, for example). 
 
Eight years later, the map was very different (Figure 2). Many of the Democratic Party’s 
landslides had disappeared; of the 525 counties Bill Clinton won by more than 20 percentage points 
in 1992 only 172 returned a similar victory for Al Gore (he won by a landslide in only eight of the 45 
counties where Bill Clinton did so in his home state of Arkansas): just sixteen switched to a 
Republican landslide, however, and the remainder became more competitive. Only parts of southern 
New England produced a substantial block of Democratic landslide counties. By contrast, much of 
the map, especially west of the Missouri and extending across most of the Mountain states into 
western California, Oregon and Washington, had turned red. There was also a very substantial 
increase in the number of red counties to the east of the Mississippi, leaving only the counties of the 
upper Midwest, New England and much of the eastern seaboard with relatively close results in that 
election (a pattern also observed by Hopkins, 2017). 
 
That large block of red remained in place at the next three elections – 2004, 2008 and 2012 
– and the only significant change was an increase in the number of Democratic landslides: Gore won 
by that margin in just 192 counties in 2000, whereas Obama succeeded in doing so in 323 eight years 
later, winning by the same margin again in 255 of them in 2012. Those successes were concentrated 
along the eastern and western seaboards, in New England and in New Mexico: there was no return 
to substantial Democratic hegemony in the Black Belt (Figure 3). 
 
The elections from 1992 to 2012 were part of what students of American politics call a 
continuing sequence, of normal voting when most people retain their partisan preferences across 
                                                          
4 We are grateful are grateful to Clark Archer, Fred Shelley and Bob Watrell for allowing us to use the county-
scale data set they compiled for presidential elections between 1992 and 2016 in this research (see Johnston 
et al., 2016). 
5 These maps were created using a carefully-constructed data set by Clark Archer, Fred Shelley and Bob Watrel 




elections, producing a relatively constant electoral geography (Converse, 1976; Key, 1955; Archer 
and Taylor, 1981). In this case, however, although the maps’ general pattern retained their same 
shape (the areas of Republican and Democratic dominance were little changed) the topography 
became more exaggerated with the larger number of landslide victories, especially for the 
Republicans (Figure 4).  
 
For some commentators, the 2016 election promised to be a deviation from that general 
pattern, as Trump relatively successfully campaigned among the disadvantaged white working class 
in areas where Republican landslides had previously been rare (much of the ‘Rustbelt’, for example). 
He won by landslides again in almost every county where Romney had in 2012 (indeed, only eight of 
those landslides were not repeated four years later), and added a further 507, mainly in the north-
east (other than New England). There was less change to the geography of Democratic landslides: 
Hillary Clinton repeated Obama’s success in 202 of the 266 counties where he won by more than 20 
points – and only one county that provided Obama with a landslide victory did so for Trump. (On the 
2017 election as part of the continuing sequence see Johnston, Pattie et al., 2017.) 
 
The very different geographies of landslide victories for the Republican and Democratic 
Party candidates are clearly identified in the summary maps (Figures 5 and 6). For the Republicans, a 
majority of counties west of the Missouri were won by landslides at six or seven of the elections 
(Figure 5), as was also the case with many counties on the western fringe of the Appalachians and 
parts of the ‘rust belt’ (notably in Indiana, Ohio and Pennsylvania). Once the Republicans gained a 
landslide hold on a county they were very unlikely to lose it: of the 559 counties won by 20 
percentage points or more in 1992, for example, only 28 were not won by that margin again in 2016 
– and only two of those were Democratic landslide victories at the latter date. The Republicans won 
by a landslide in 587 and 610 counties respectively in 1992 and 1996, and then in 1428 when George 
W. Bush won his first election in 2000. Of the 725 counties won by a landslide then but not at the 
previous two contests, 225 were won by a landslide by neither party in 2008 (Obama’s first victory) 
but by 2016 only 36 did not return a landslide Republican victory. Having become the dominant 
party in a county, the Republicans rarely saw their hegemony challenged in a contest where they 
failed to win again by at least 20 percentage points. 
 
The contrast between the two maps in Figures 5 and 6 is stark. That for the Democratic Party 
has relatively few clusters of counties coloured dark blue, where its candidates won by more than 20 
points at almost all of the seven elections. Apart from concentrations on the west coast, in New 
Mexico, along the southern Mississippi, in central Alabama and much of New England (especially 
Massachusetts and Vermont), there are also some areas (shown in the lighter blue) where the 
Democrats won landslide victories at a few contests – in Maine, for example, and parts of Arkansas 
(Bill Clinton’s home state); but much of the country is blank – large tracts of territory, even whole 
states (Nebraska and Nevada), where the Democratic Party candidates failed to win a county by a 
landslide at even one of the seven elections. The high point was in 1996, when there were 542 
Democratic landslide wins. At the next election in 2000 this was reduced to just 192; there was a 
recovery in 2008 and 2012, when Obama won landslides in 323 and 266 counties respectively, but 
this fell back to 226 in 2016. Bill Clinton gained a landslide victory in 542 counties in 1996, but Hillary 
Clinton won by a similar margin in only 165 of them in 2016, and she gained a landslide victory in 
just 208 of the 323 where Barack Obama did in 2008. 
 
This asymmetry in the number of landslide counties is further illustrated in Table 1, which 
gives the percentage of the 3115 counties analysed here according to how many landslides they 
recorded over the seven elections. Comparing the two parties, the difference is stark: whereas some 
three-quarters of the counties returned a Democratic landslide at none of the contests, that was the 
case for only just over one-quarter for Republican landslides. Similarly, whereas 20.4 per cent of 
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counties returned a Republican landslide on six or seven occasions, and 37.4 per cent on at least five, 
the comparable figures for Democratic landslides were just 4.8 and 5.9 per cent. 
 
The maps indicate considerable geographical variation in the distribution of landslide 
victories, therefore; this is encapsulated in Table 2 which shows the percentage of counties by the 
number of landslides for each party and of no landslides, by the nine Census Divisions. Nearly one-in-
five of the counties returned a landslide for neither party at any election, for example, but that 
varied from just over 8 per cent in the East North Central division to almost 47 per cent in the 
Mountain division. Those returning no landslide at five or more of the seven elections formed more 
than half of the total number of counties in the East North Central, Mid-Atlantic and New England 
census divisions (i.e. the north-eastern parts of the country) and 45 per cent of the total in the 
Pacific region. By comparison, 46.9 per cent of counties in the Mountain division returned a landslide 
for one of the two parties at every election – in almost all cases for the Republican Party’s candidate. 
Within that division, 52 per cent of counties in Idaho returned a landslide for one of the parties at 
every election, as did 65 per cent of those in Utah and 77 per cent in Nebraska. These were 
overwhelmingly delivered for the Republican candidate: only one county in Idaho regularly returned 
a Democratic landslide; one Utah county did so at one election; and at none of the seven elections 
did even a single Nevada county deliver a Democratic landslide. New England was the only division 
at which over one-quarter of the counties returned a Democratic landslide at five or more of the 
seven elections, and of the other divisions only in the Pacific did even 15 per cent of counties return 
five or more Democratic landslides – a clear contrast to the five divisions where over 30 per cent of 
counties returned a landslide at five or more elections for the Republicans. 
 
A misleading cartography? 
 
A sequence of Republican presidential candidates – George W. Bush, John McCain, Mitt Romney and 
Donald Trump – painted an increasing proportion of the map of American counties red according to 
this cartographic analysis. By 2016, 72 per cent of all counties returned a Republican landslide 
victory, compared to just 7 per cent for the Democrats – leaving only just over one-fifth of the 
country’s counties where the contest between the two parties was relatively close. But this 
geography does not correspond with the overall outcome of that final election in the sequence, 
when Hillary Clinton outvoted Donald Trump by 48.2 to 46.1 per cent. The reason, as several 
commentators have pointed out, is misleading cartography; the Republicans tend to win by large 
majorities in counties with relatively small populations – i.e. in rural and small-town America – 
leaving the Democrats winning by similar margins in a much smaller number of counties with very 
large populations – i.e. metropolitan America. 
 
This clear difference is illustrated by Table 3. The first block shows the mean number of 
votes cast in each type of county at each election and illustrates a widening gap between the two 
parties. In 1992, the average county won with a Democratic landslide had about three times as many 
votes cast as the average county won with a Republican landslide; in 2016, the difference was 
almost ten times. As the number of Republican landslide counties increased almost fourfold their 
mean population increased by less than 20 per cent; Republican predominance was predominantly 
in small town and rural America. For the Democrats, whereas the number of counties where Hillary 
Clinton won by a landslide was less than half of the number won by Bill Clinton twenty-four years 
earlier, the mean number of votes cast in those landslide counties grew by some 280 per cent over 
the same period. Fewer places but more people – i.e. in the country’s large cities – delivered 
Democratic landslides. 
 
This stark difference is brought into further relief in Table 3’s second block of data, which 
shows the total number of votes cast in each type of county at each election. At the first two 
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contests, many more votes were cast in Democratic- than in Republican-landslide counties (over 
three times as many in 1996). Although the gap closed thereafter, there were more voters in 
Democratic- than Republican-landslide counties at each successive election except 2004; and despite 
the massive difference in the number of counties won by landslides between the two parties’ 
candidates in 2016 they had almost the same number of votes. Red might outshine blue on the map, 
but only because of the differences in the electorate of counties won by a landslide. Furthermore, as 
the data in the first column of the second block in Table 3 show, more than half of the total number 
of votes at every election until 2012 and 2016 were cast in counties that delivered a landslide to 
neither candidate: purple America was numerically larger than either red or blue America, but was 
increasingly unseen because those purple counties, too, had relatively large voting populations. 
 
Reanalysing the map: a metropolitan-rural continuum 
 
At the county scale, therefore, the polarization of America’s electoral geography appears to have 
involved, in effect, a growing metropolitan-rural divide. To explore this further, counties have been 
grouped according to a scheme developed by the National Center for Health Statistics (Ingram and 
Franco, 2013). It has six categories: 
 
Metropolitan 
1. Large Central Metro – these counties are parts of Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with 
more than one million inhabitants: they either contain the entire population of the MSA’s 
central cities; or have their entire population in the MSA’s largest central city; or contain at 
least 250,000 of the population of one of the MSA’s principal cities. 
2. Large Fringe Metro – these are counties in MSAs with more than one million inhabitants that 
did not qualify as Large Central Metros (i.e. they are basically suburban areas of large 
metropolises). 
3. Medium Metro – all of the counties in MSAs with populations between 250,000 and 
999,999. 
4. Small Metro – counties in MSAs with less than 250,000 inhabitants. 
Non-Metropolitan 
5. Micropolitan – counties in defined micropolitan urban areas (with populations of 10,000-
49,999). 
6. Noncore – all other counties (i.e. rural). 
 
Table 4 shows the percentage of counties in each of those six categories that returned either a 
landslide victory for one of the parties’ candidate or no landslide, at each election. The difference 
between the two parties is again stark, and becomes starker over time. For the Democratic Party, as 
one proceeds through the six categories, from the inner cities of major metropolitan areas through 
their suburbs, the smaller cities and into small-town and rural America, the percentage of counties 
returning a landslide declines, increasingly precipitately. Complementing that pattern, as one moves 
down the columns so the percentage returning a Republican landslide increases. Democratic 
landslides were especially characteristic of the central cities of large metropolitan areas – and 
increasingly only so; Republican landslides increasingly dominated all other sections of America. 
Further, and importantly, given that up to half of all Americans who cast votes lived there, whereas 
at the early elections in the sequence there was little difference across the six categories in the 
percentage of counties that delivered a landslide to neither party’s candidate, by 2016 their smaller 
number was increasingly concentrated in the bigger places. The smaller places became more 
polarized – almost entirely in favour of the Republican Party – whereas the largest places were 





Those trends over time are clarified by comparisons along the rows in Table 5. For the Large 
Central Metros, the later elections saw a not-inconsiderable increase in the percentage of counties 
delivering a Democratic landslide (from 48.4 to 64.5) and a fall to zero in the corresponding 
percentage of Republican landslides. The percentage of counties with no landslide also declined: 
America’s central cities became increasingly-polarized, Democratic Party heartlands. In their suburbs 
(the Large Fringe Metros), on the other hand, there was increasing polarization into Republican 
landslides: the percentage of counties returning a Democratic landslide remained consistently small 
– never more than 16 per cent –  but the dominant pattern of relatively evenly-matched parties (in 
1992, 63 per cent of these counties returned a landslide for neither party) was replaced by 
Republican-dominated suburbia from 2000 on. 
 
In the next two categories – the medium and small metropolitan areas – increased 
Republican dominance was even more marked, as the percentage of counties with either 
Democratic or, even more so, no landslide declined very substantially. This pattern was repeated in 
the Micropolitan and NonCore (i.e. rural) areas where Republican landslides increased fourfold over 
the period, Democratic landslides declined (precipitately in rural areas), and the percentage of 
counties where neither party dominated over the other also fell very substantially. By 2016 83.7 per 
cent of NonCore counties delivered a landslide victory for the Republican candidate, compared to 
21.9 per cent twenty-four years earlier. 
 
Changing the scale 
 
The results discussed above conform to Bishop’s general argument regarding increased polarization 
of the American electorate over recent decades – the trend he had observed continued over the 
three further presidential elections in 2008, 2012 and 2016. The percentage of counties without a 
landslide victory for either party’s candidate declined steeply from a little under 64 per cent in 1992 
to just over 20 per cent in 2016. In that clear sense, the American electorate has become 
geographically more polarized in its support for Republican and Democratic Party candidates. 
 
That headline pattern has to be qualified somewhat, however. Although nearly four-in-five 
counties returned a landslide victory for either Donald Trump or Hillary Clinton in 2016, nevertheless 
more votes were cast in those counties where there was no landslide for either candidate than in 
those where one or the other won by a margin of at least twenty percentage points. The modal US 
county in 2016 saw a relatively close race between the two main parties’ candidates. Indeed, until 
2012 more votes were cast in counties where there was no landslide victory than in a combination of 
those where one of the two candidates had a landslide victory, and by 2016 just under 40 per cent of 
all votes were still cast in the ‘no landslide’ counties. 
 
Furthermore, the growth in landslide counties was asymmetric, in two ways. First, although 
many more counties returned Republican than Democratic landslide majorities over the seven 
elections, nevertheless at all but one of those contests (2004) more votes were cast in counties that 
returned a landslide for the Democratic Party’s candidate than in those where the Republicans’ 
candidate prevailed by the same margin. Secondly, the growth in the number of Republican 
landslides was very much concentrated in rural America, whereas in the metropolitan areas – 
especially their central cities – there were very few such counties; those inner city, high density 
areas were characterized, at all seven elections, by a combination of counties returning either a 
Democratic landslide or no landslide. The dominant geographical element was thus, as others have 
noted (Lichter and Ziliak, 2017), a growing metropolitan-urban-rural cleavage. 
 
Those findings, though consistent with Bishop’s general arguments and analyses, are in an 
important respect incommensurate with the more detailed features of his claims regarding the ‘big 
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sort’. Much of his case regarding increased spatial polarization involves discussion of 
neighbourhoods and similar geographical units that are typically very much smaller than the average 
county: indeed, the average county in the central city of an MSA with a population of over one 
million will contain a myriad separate – if often overlapping – neighbourhoods. For example, Bishop 
(2009, 40) encourages his readers to 
… look around: our own streets are filled with people who live alike, think alike, and vote 
alike. This social transformation didn’t happen by accident. We have built a country where 
everyone can choose the neighborhood (and church and news shows) most compatible with 
his or her lifestyle and beliefs. And we are living with the consequences of this segregation 
by way of life: pockets of like-minded citizens that have become so identically inbred that we 
don’t know, can’t understand and can barely conceive of “those people” who live just a few 
miles away. 
His geographical terms – streets, neighborhoods, ‘pockets of like-minded citizens’ – refer to much 
smaller areas than counties and although in some rural districts there may be relative uniformity 
across substantial tracts of territory in their populations’ socio-economic and -demographic 
characteristics, this is almost certainly not the case across a majority of metropolitan counties, 
although many there may contain substantial blocks of contiguous neighbourhoods with similar 
features. So what is the situation within counties? 
 
To address this question, we use data for voting patterns by precincts. There is no central 
aggregating agency for precinct-level election data in United States, nor is there in many states, so 
collection of precinct-level results for the 2012 and 2016 presidential elections required contacting 
the relevant electoral authorities in each state and county as needed. In most cases, state 
Secretaries of State or Election Boards provided state-wide precinct results, but several states 
required contacting each county’s electoral authority independently, namely Colorado, Indiana, 
Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Kansas, Kentucky, Oregon, and West 
Virginia required county-specific contact for a minority of counties. Most electoral authorities 
provided results without charge via email or fax, but units such as Utah and many counties in 
Missouri required fees for access to their data. The Harvard Election Data Archive supplied precinct-
level results for the 2008 presidential election. No data were available for earlier elections so in this 
section we can only analyse the last three. 
 
Because precinct boundaries are frequently changed – especially though not only when 
there is a redistricting of electoral units, such as Congressional Districts – their number varied across 
the three elections. There were 189,697 for the 2008 election, with a mean number of votes cast of 
690. In 2012, there were 173,524 with a mean of 712 votes cast; and in 2016 the mean was 780, 
across 173,526 precincts. 
 
Table 6 shows the distribution of the three types of landslide at the precinct scale across the 
six types of county, for the three elections. The first block shows the distribution across the rows – 
i.e. each type within each year: thus, for example, 49.0 per cent of the precincts returning a 
Democratic landslide in 2008 were in the Large Metro Central counties and 19.6 per cent were in the 
Large Metro Fringe counties. The main feature of these figures is the absence of substantial change 
across the three elections; the distribution of precincts returning a Democratic landslide across the 
six types, for example, was little different in 2016 from the distribution in 2008.  
 
The second block of data shows the percentage of precincts according to its landslide 
category in each of the six types at each election – in 2008, for example, 59.4 per cent of all precincts 
in Large Metro Central counties returned a Democratic landslide, for example, and 9.5 per cent 
returned a Republican landslide. These percentages suggest greater change across the three 
elections in most of the county types. The large metropolitan central cities – the first type – had just 
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a small increase (of 4.5 percentage points) in the precincts returning Democratic landslides between 
2008 and 2016 and an even smaller decline in the percentage returning landslides. Elsewhere, across 
all five remaining types the dominant, and increasingly substantial, trend is for an increase in the 
percentage of precincts returning a Republican landslide, especially between 2012 and 2016. That 
percentage increased in the Micropolitan areas from 40.4 to 47.6 between the two Obama victories 
of 2008 and 2016 and then jumped to 65.9 per cent in 2016; and in the Noncore (i.e. predominantly 
rural) areas the increase was from 48.9 to 60.2 in the first inter-election period and then to 81.1 in 
the second. The country’s inner cities swung slightly to the Democrats over the short period; in the 
suburbs and beyond, there was a swing towards the Republicans while Obama remained in power 
but when Trump faced Hillary Clinton that was magnified very considerably. 
 
At the precinct scale, therefore – the scale of the neighbourhood on which most of Bishop’s 
discussion, if not his data and maps, focused – the metropolitan-rural continuum again stands out. 
The pattern changed very little in the metropolitan central cities over the three elections: a majority 
of the precincts returned a Democratic landslide, less than one-tenth of all precincts returned a 
Republican landslide, and there was a landslide for neither party in between one-quarter and one-
third of all precincts. In all of the other five types – from the suburbs of large metropolitan areas 
through to the rural areas – the dominant change was a significant reduction in the percentage of 
precincts that returned a landslide for neither party and a substantial increase in the percentage 
delivering a landslide for the Republicans. 
 
This lack of substantial change in the large metropolitan areas, especially their central cities, 
between 2012 and 2016 is somewhat surprising, given that much of Trump’s campaign focused on 
the relatively deprived, white working-class, many of whom lived in those places (Kivisto, 2017; 
Ashcroft, 2017). To explore this further we used a statistical classification algorithm to group 
together metropolitan areas (SMSAs) according to the percentage of their precincts at each of the 
elections that returned no landslide, a Democratic landslide or a Republican landslide. Eight groups 
were identified, and the average percentages for each are in Table 7. Of the 373 SMSAs for which we 
have data, only 51 showed no appreciable change: eleven (group 1) had a Democratic landslide in 
the great majority of their precincts at all three elections and forty similarly saw a Republican 
landslide in most of their precincts at each contest. The third group of 92 SMSAs, which included 
almost all of the country’s biggest cities, saw very little change in their profiles, with the largest 
percentage of precincts delivering a Democratic landslide. The remaining five groups were all 
characterised, to some extent, by an increase in the percentage of precincts that returned a 
Republican landslide. By far the biggest absolute change in that direction was in the forty SMSAs in 
the seventh group, where the percentage of Republican landslide precincts increased fourfold from 
16 to 64. Many of those SMSAs are in the East North Central division – rustbelt places such as 
Carbondale-Marion, IL, Evansville, IN-KY, Johnstown, PA, and Wheeling, WV-OH, where Trump 
substantially extended the Republican’s dominance in many neighborhoods. 
 
As the country’s smaller city, small town and rural counties became more predominantly 
Republican in their voting for president, therefore, so an increasing share of their precincts returned 
a landslide victory for the Republican candidates. In many metropolitan areas, on the other hand, 
there was relatively little change in the percentage of precincts returning a landslide for one or the 
other party’s candidate, but that was not the case where Trump made substantial inroads to the 
Democratic Party’s dominance in some rustbelt – mainly smaller – metropolitan areas. 
 
Within most large metropolitan areas change in the pattern of landslide victories was largely 
concentrated in the suburban counties. This is illustrated by the fourteen-county Chicago-
Napierville-Elgin SMSA, thirteen of which are classed as Large Central Metro in the NCHS 
classification and the remainder as Large Fringe Metro. They are split into three groups in Table 8: 
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Cook County – the Large Central Metro which includes the City of Chicago; four counties which 
border on Cook (the inner suburbs); and the nine ‘outer suburban’ counties. Very little changed in 
Cook County over the three elections: over three-quarters of precincts returned a Democratic 
landslide at each and there were virtually no Republican landslide precincts. The next group of four 
counties – the ‘inner suburbs’ – are characterised, with the exception of Lake County (IN), by large 
shares of precincts returning no landslide at any of the three elections and with only small 
percentages returning Republican landslides. Finally, the main feature of the nine ‘outer suburban’ 
counties is the substantial increase in most in the percentage of precincts delivering a Republican 
landslide – every precinct in two cases in 2016. 
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
Bishop’s book The Big Sort introduced a linked pair of hypotheses to the study of the electoral 
geography of the United States. Empirical investigations show that one of these – that the country is 
becoming increasingly polarized, as shown by the patterns of voting for Democratic and Republican 
Party candidates for the presidency – has considerable validity, both nationally and locally at a 
variety of spatial scales. The second – that the polarization is linked to greater self-selection in 
migration patterns: people are increasingly congregating together with those with whom they share 
attitudes that are reflected in their voting behaviour – has, as yet, gained only muted support. 
 
This paper has focused on the first of those hypotheses, using Bishop’s chosen measure of 
polarization – the percentage of areas (counties in his case) won by a landslide majority of twenty 
percentage points or more – to explore its geography in greater detail than presented in his book or 
elsewhere (though see the atlases of recent elections: Brunn et al., 2010; Archer et al., 2014; Watrel 
et al., 2018). Cartographically, it appears that over the period 1992-2016 the country not only 
became increasingly polarized (more counties delivered a landslide victory for one of the party’s 
candidates) but also that the main beneficiary of that trend was the Republican Party. Closer 
examination showed that although it was indeed the case that more counties delivered a Republican 
landslide, most of them were relatively small in their number of voters if not area and at all but one 
of the seven elections studied more voters lived in counties that returned a Democratic rather than 
a Republican landslide – and even more lived in counties that delivered a landslide for neither party. 
 
Closer examination of the pattern of changes using a classification of counties showed that 
the main change in the frequency of Republican landslides occurred outside the metropolitan areas, 
especially their central cities. Whereas in most SMSAs the central cities were dominated by the 
Democratic Party across all seven elections, with very few of them returning a Republican landslide, 
an increasing number of suburban counties switched from delivering no landslide to one favouring 
the Republicans and by 2016 a majority of counties beyond the metropolitan borders delivered such 
a landslide. In the rural counties, fully 81 per cent of precincts gave the Republican candidate a 
landslide victory then, although there were considerable geographical variations – for example, no 
state in New England had more than 40 per cent of precincts in the fifth and sixth NCHS types 
returning a Republican landslide, whereas in each of Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, 
Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, West Virginia and Wyoming that was 
the case in over 90 per cent of precincts. 
 
This rural-urban continuum in presidential voting patterns across most of the United States 
has become more pronounced recently, with the Democratic Party increasingly attracting strong 
support only in the major metropolitan areas, especially their central cities and some of their 
suburbs: ‘where the suburbs start to resemble rural exurbia, and in the vast rural regions beyond, 
Republicans find much friendlier territory’ (Scala and Johnson, 2017, 181). Residents in those 
increasingly pro-Republican areas, including many who have retired there from the big cities, are 
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more religious, less liberal in their attitudes (on same-sex marriage and abortion, for example) and 
want stricter controls on immigration and immigrants – attitudes that make them more likely to 
favour Republican candidates, especially Donald Trump (see Gorski, 2017). But most Americans live 
in the country’s metropolitan areas and they, especially their suburbs given that there is already a 
Democratic hegemony in most of the central cities, are likely to form the main battleground at 
future elections. They are, however, the parts of the country, as this analysis has shown, which have 
experienced least change recently. Bishop’s discussion of his polarization hypothesis focused on the 
streets and neighbourhoods that are becoming more homogeneous and as a consequence more 
likely to provide a landslide victory for one of the two parties. But in the country’s densely populated 
cities the data presented here have found little evidence of more landslide victories at the precinct 
(i.e. neighbourhood) scale over the last three elections. The big changes have been in some of the 
less densely populated suburbs, in the smaller towns and cities, and in the rural areas, where the 
number of Republican landslide victories has increased substantially but which – even in 2016 – 
housed only 30 per cent of those who voted. 
 
In his discussion of the growing ideological and attitudinal polarization of the American 
electorate, Campbell (2016) asked whether the consequences of the divergence might include that 
the country’s legislative bodies would become less representative, that governance of such a divided 
country would become more difficult and less effective – and, if so, what could be done about it. His 
discussion of those and other issues made no reference to the potential impact of the growing 
spatial polarization outlined here – pitting metropolitan America (especially its large central cities 
and their inner suburbs) against the rest of the country. One aspect of that spatial polarization which 
could have an important influence on the ideological polarization of the country’s legislature is the 
potential it offers for even more gerrymandering and the creation of safe seats, which in its turn 
favours the selection and election of more ideologically extreme candidates. By indicating that it 
knew of no judicial standard against which it could determine whether a districting map was a 
gerrymander – unlike the situation with the numerical standard used to outlaw malapportionment – 
a Supreme Court 2006 judgement encouraged more extensive gerrymandering. The Republican 
Party capitalised on this in the redistricting exercises that followed the 2010 census (McGann et al., 
2016; see also Daley, 2016) and the Court’s 2018 judgements dismissing two further cases claiming 
partisan – pro-Republican – gerrymandering will encourage its continued deployment, leading to a 
more divided House of Representatives and make questions regarding both the institution’s 
representativeness and the barriers to effective democratic government even more moot (Johnston, 
2018). 
 
Within the large literature on political polarization in the contemporary United States, the 
issue of spatial polarization has received relatively little attention. Bishop’s book challenged that 
situation, and the empirical evidence assembled over the last decade (notably at the state and 
district scales by Hopkins, 2017), and extended here, has validated his general hypothesis. Spatial 
polarization has increased – but the changing patterns are more nuanced, more geographically 
variable, than a simple chasm opening up across the whole country. The changes outlined here 
indeed indicate increased polarization but it has been more intense in some parts of the urban-rural 
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Table 1. The percentage of counties according to the number of landslides recorded at the US 
presidential elections, 1992-2016 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
No Landslides 18.2 8.2 20.3 12.1 9.9 8.8 12.2 10.1 
Democratic Landslides 75.5 7.1 7.5 2.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 3.5 





Table 2. The percentage of counties according to the number of elections at which they delivered a 
Democratic landslide, a Republican landslide or no landslide, by census division 
 
   Number of Elections 
Division 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Democratic Landslides 
New England 16.4 17.9 22.4 6.0 10.4 4.5 9.0 13.4 
Mid Atlantic 73.3 8.0 5.3 2.7 1.3 2.0 0.7 6.7 
East North Central 77.3 9.8 5.9 3.0 0.0 1.1 0.9 1.8 
West North Central 84.4 5.9 5.0 1.3 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.5 
South Atlantic 75.3 5.6 6.7 4.7 0.9 1.3 1.4 4.2 
East South Central 70.1 8.2 9.9 4.4 0.8 1.4 1.1 4.1 
West South Central 69.4 9.4 14.3 2.1 0.9 0.9 1.1 2.1 
Mountain 87.7 2.7 3.2 0.8 1.3 0.5 0.8 2.9 
Pacific 69.3 4.4 3.6 2.9 4.4 2.2 2.9 10.2 
TOTAL 75.5 7.1 7.5 2.8 1.1 1.1 1.3 3.5 
Republican Landslides 
New England 97.0 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Mid Atlantic 45.3 20.0 6.0 2.7 9.3 6.7 5.3 4.7 
East North Central 25.4 28.8 7.8 7.6 11.4 7.8 4.8 6.4 
West North Central 13.7 23.6 8.0 7.8 8.4 14.3 8.6 15.6 
South Atlantic 32.5 7.8 10.5 6.3 10.1 19.3 5.6 7.9 
East South Central 18.7 6.6 9.1 11.9 16.8 19.2 4.7 13.2 
West South Central 13.8 3.6 3.4 12.8 11.1 34.0 5.1 16.2 
Mountain 18.0 4.3 2.7 2.9 5.9 14.7 7.5 44.0 
Pacific 54.7 4.4 8.0 7.3 3.6 13.1 7.3 1.5 
TOTAL 25.1 12.6 6.9 7.7 9.9 17.2 6.0 14.7 
No Landslides 
New England 13.4 9.0 4.5 10.4 6.0 25.4 14.9 16.4 
Mid Atlantic 11.3 6.0 9.3 10.0 6.7 12.0 22.0 22.7 
East North Central 8.2 5.7 9.4 11.9 14.0 13.5 24.7 12.6 
West North Central 17.3 9.3 15.4 9.9 12.4 8.2 21.7 5.7 
South Atlantic 12.1 7.4 22.0 12.5 11.9 10.6 8.5 15.0 
East South Central 17.3 8.2 25.0 22.5 10.2 5.2 3.8 7.7 
West South Central 18.5 10.2 41.3 12.3 7.0 4.5 3.6 2.6 
Mountain 46.9 8.3 15.5 7.2 4.3 5.1 5.6 7.0 
Pacific 11.7 10.2 15.3 8.0 10.2 11.7 8.8 24.1 








Table 3. The number of voters in ‘landslide counties’, 1992-2016 
 
Type of landslide None Republican Democrat Total . 
Mean number of votes cast 
1992 26,093 14,473 44,604 27,036 
1996 25,859 13,067 51,682 27,888 
2000 38,253 15,329 121,524 32,809 
2004 51,462 19,412 152,053 39,167 
2008 49,185 15,776 123,136 41,852 
2012 57,168 16,424 131,888 41,002 
2016 79,938 17,281 169,872 41,487 
Total number of votes cast 
1992 51,220,295 8,510,223 23,462,140 83,192,568 
1996 49,726,147 7,971,081 28,115,946 85,812,724 
2000 55,733,983 21,889,521 23,332,700 100,956,204 
2004 62,886,776 32,845,280 24,784,729 120,516,785 
2008 66,596,774 22,038,784 40,142,371 128,777,929 
2012 62,368,779 28,184,145 35,609,789 126,163,713 









Table 4. The percentage of counties returning a Democratic or a Republican landslide, or no 
landslide, at each presidential election 1992-2016, according to the NCHS classification of counties 
 
 No Dem Rep No Dem Rep 
 1992   1996 
Large Central Metro 48.4 48.4 3.2 48.4 50.0 1.6  
Large Fringe Metro 63.4 12.8 23.9 65.1 16.2 18.8 
Medium Metro 71.0 13.4 15.6 65.3 18.0 16.7 
Small Metro 71.1 14.6 14.3 69.7 13.1 17.1 
Micropolitan 67.5 15.6 17.0 67.3 15.9 16.8 
NonCore 58.9 19.2 21.9 57.4 18.5 24.1 
TOTAL 63.8 17.1 19.1 62.5 17.6 19.9 
 2000   2004 
Large Central Metro 46.8 45.2 8.1 50.0 41.9 8.1 
Large Fringe Metro 49.4 8.0 42.6 41.2 5.4 53.4 
Medium Metro 56.0 7.4 36.6 47.0 6.3 46.7 
Small Metro 52.3 3.1 44.6 42.0 2.9 55.1 
Micropolitan 49.5 5.2 45.3 41.4 4.4 54.2 
NonCore 41.8 5.0 53.3 35.1 4.4 60.5 
TOTAL 47.2 6.3 46.5 39.5 5.3 55.1 
 2008   2012 
Large Central Metro 40.3 58.1 1.6 40.3 56.5 3.2 
Large Fringe Metro 51.4 11.6 36.9 44.0 9.1 46.9 
Medium Metro 49.7 13.9 36.3 45.1 11.7 43.2 
Small Metro 47.4 9.4 43.1 37.4 7.1 55.4 
Micropolitan 46.2 10.2 43.6 37.7 7.9 54.4 
NonCore 38.5 7.4 54.0 28.6 6.2 65.2 
TOTAL 44.0 10.5 45.5 35.5 8.7 55.9  
 2016 
Large Central Metro 35.5 64.5 0.0 
Large Fringe Metro 29.8 10.2 59.9   
Medium Metro 33.6 9.0 57.4 
Small Metro 26.3 6.3 67.4 
Micropolitan 20.1 6.4 73.4 
NonCore 12.2 4.1 83.7 





Table 5. Changes in the percentage of counties by landslide type and county type, 1992-2016. 
 
  1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 2016 
Large Central Metro 
 No Landslide 48.4 48.4 46.8 50.0 40.3 40.3 35.5 
 Democratic Landslide 48.4 50.0 45.2 41.9 58.1 56.5 64.5 
 Republican Landslide 3.2 1.6 8.1 8.1 1.6 3.2 0.0 
Large Fringe Metro 
 No Landslide 63.4 65.1 49.4 41.2 51.4 44.0 29.8 
 Democratic Landslide 12.8 16.2 8.0 5.4 11.6 9.1 10.2 
 Republican Landslide 23.9 18.8 42.6 53.4 36.9 46.9 59.9 
Medium Metro 
 No Landslide 71.0 65.3 56.0 47.0 49.7 45.1 33.6 
 Democratic Landslide 13.4 18.0 7.4 6.3 13.3 11.7 9.0 
 Republican Landslide 15.6 16.7 36.6 46.7 36.3 43.2 57.4 
Small Metro  
 No Landslide 71.1 69.7 52.3 42.0 47.4 37.4 26.3 
 Democratic Landslide 14.6 13.1 3.1 2.9 9.4 7.1 6.3 
 Republican Landslide 14.3 17.1 44.6 55.1 43.1 55.4 67.4 
Micropolitan 
 No Landslide 67.5 67.3 49.5 41.4 46.2 37.7 20.1 
 Democratic Landslide 15.6 15.9 5.2 4.4 10.2 7.9 6.4 
 Republican Landslide 17.0 16.8 45.3 54.2 43.6 54.4 73.4 
NonCore 
 No Landslide 58.9 57.4 41.8 35.1 38.5 28.6 12.2 
 Democratic Landslide 19.2 18.5 5.0 4.4 7.4 6.2 4.1 






Table 6. The percentage of precincts returning a Democratic or a Republican landslide, or no 
landslide, at the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections, according to the NCHS classification of 
counties 
 
  LMetC LMetF MMet SMet MiMet NCore TOTAL 
Percentages of Row Totals 
2008 
 No Landslide 22.2 26.7 18.2 10.0 11.8 11.2 100.0  
 Democratic Landslide 49.0 19.6 16.3 5.6 5.5 3.9 100.0 
 Republican Landslide 10.6 18.5 19.0 12.3 17.7 21.9 100.0 
 TOTAL 28.5 22.1 17.7 9.1 11.1 11.4 100.0 
2012 
 No Landslide 22.7 26.9 17.9 9.8 12.7 10.0 100.0 
 Democratic Landslide 51.0 18.9 16.3 5.2 5.1 3.5 100.0 
 Republican Landslide 10.4 19.7 18.0 12.7 17.3 21.9 100.0 
 TOTAL 28.0 22.0 17.4 9.2 11.7 11.7 100.0  
2016 
 No Landslide 27.0 30.5 20.5 8.0 9.2 4.8 100.0 
 Democratic Landslide 54.8 20.4 15.0 4.5 3.3 2.1 100.0 
 Republican Landslide 6.5 19.0 18.2 13.0 19.3 23.9 100.0 
 TOTAL 28.6 22.8 17.8 8.7 11.0 11.1 100.0 
Percentages in Type 
2008 
 No Landslide 31.1 48.1 40.9 44.0 42.4 39.1 40.0 
 Democratic Landslide 59.4 30.6 31.8 21.3 17.1 11.9 34.5 
 Republican Landslide 9.5 21.3 27.3 34.8 40.4 48.9 25.5 
2012 
 No Landslide 28.3 42.9 35.9 37.2 37.9 29.9 35.0 
 Democratic Landslide 59.8 28.3 30.8 18.5 14.4 10.0 32.9 
 Republican Landslide 11.9 28.8 33.2 44.3 47.6 60.2 32.1 
2016 
 No Landslide 27.4 38.9 33.3 26.6 24.2 12.6 29.0 
 Democratic Landslide 63.9 29.9 28.1 17.2 9.8 6.3 33.4 





Table 7. The profiles of the eight groups of SMSAs according to the percentage of their precincts 
delivering each type of landslide at the three US presidential elections, 2012-2016 
      
     Group 
Landslides (%) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
No 2008 8.5 10.8 37.9 53.3 35.3 61.6 67.3 32.2 
No 2012 9.8 8.3 34.7 44.3 42.0 65.8 54.3 23.9 
No 2016 13.2 7.2 30.9 42.8 50.9 57.5 29.0 17.4 
Democratic 2008 90.5 5.5 44.0 17.0 63.4 34.9 16.5 12.5 
Democratic 2012 88.2 5.4 42.7 15.8 54.5 27.9 11.6 11.5 
Democratic 2016 85.0 5.5 44.8 16.4 34.3 22.9 6.7 10.8 
Republican 2008 1.0 83.8 18.1 29.4 1.3 3.5 16.2 55.3 
Republican 2012 2.1 86.3 22.6 39.9 3.5 6.4 34.1 64.6 
Republican 2016 1.9 87.3 24.3 40.9 14.8 19.7 64.3 71.8 







Table 8. Percentage of precincts returning no landslide, a Democratic landslide or a Republican 
landslide at the 2008, 2012 and 2016 presidential elections in the fourteen counties of the Chicago-
Napier-Elgin SMSA 
 
 No Landslide Democratic Landslide Republican Landslide 
County 2008 2012 2016 2008 2012 2016 2008 2012 2016 
Cook 20 22 18 79 75 81 1 3 1 
Lake (IL) 52 52 45 44 33 49 4 15 6 
Du Page 70 70 57 27 15 40 4 15 2 
Will 59 50 47 35 35 35 6 14 18 
Lake (IN) 34 34 37 62 59 50 4 7 14 
Kenosha 65 50 56 32 36 33 4 14 10 
McHenry 81 78 76 17 2 3 1 20 21 
Kane 50 46 51 45 34 42 4 20 7 
DeKalb 45 50 43 48 32 31 7 18 26 
Kendall 68 61 63 23 15 12 9 24 25 
Grundy 84 72 25 9 0 0 7 28 75 
Newton 67 39 0 0 0 0 33 61 100 
Jasper 59 24 0 0 0 0 41 76 100 

























Figure 5. The number of US presidential elections where the county was won by a landslide  for the 




Figure 6. The number of US presidential elections where the county was won by a landslide  for the 
Democratic party, 1992-2016. 
 
 
 
